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Fiscal  inst~ents:for raisins Community revenues 
from  energy  . 
The  fiscal  instrument at present available 
.  - "  -·  -
Three ·typ~s of tax at· present  apply to energy  a 
- generalised taxes  on  oone_umption  (VAT);  . 
- special  exciSes_ o_n  cons~ption; 
- Customs·du~y. 
1.1.  VAT  -· 
.The· coverage of VAT  is largely hannonised,  although the  level  and· 
number of rates  i.e ·not.  Two  other crucial  fa~tors relating .to  VAT  - .  -
.need to be borne  in mind.  First,  VAT  wo_uld  not·,  because  of i-ts  · 
oredi  t  mechanism,  affect  intermediate  consumption  and  would  there fore 
affect final  con,~ll.fnption alone.  Secondly,  given that  V~T  i~ n.  e-eneral 
consumption  tax,.  ~tis undeeirable'to.add a  specia!'.energy  r~t.to  to 
'  - ' 
th9se  already in force.  For these reasons,· although  VAT  ha.A  oe~tnin 
attractions  from  the  standpoint of r_elativi,  ease  of application,  it ·is 
a  relatively inflexible  instrument  for the  purposes: of spaoific  energ,y 
obje~_tives. 
·1o2.· Excises. 
As· regards the excises.  o~ mineral oils,_ nsi  ther. the  structures nor  the-
rates are· harmon  !Sed~  The  Commi_asion  has however  a· proposal  be foro  the 
Council  for harmonising the  structure of the excises on.  mineral  oils. 
·This proposal,  as at present drafted,  in effect·  confines excises on 
ini~eral oils to road .f'ue).~  ~d  domestic  heat.ing oiie. Most. other uaoa 
(and ·in  particul~r industrial use  of heavy  fuel  oils  .. for boating,· of 
. oils used as  raw materials .and  lu~ricants) are  exempt • 
. 1.3. Customs duties 
;. 
,Petroleum produots_are of oourse  included in the  Common  Cuetoma· Tariff. 
Unre'tined produota are; free  o~ duty,  whilst. refined products  n~o  nub.1r:ot 
to rates of duty ranging up to 6 %.  At  present,  a  high  proporti~n of 
dutia.bl~ products are  imported· free  of duty  for  fUrther  r.e fi~in,q; or undo:r 
preferentiRl arrangements. 
'  .;. - 2-
2~  There  are three essential elements in an,y  ta.x~  Conelderable  vn.ri"tion 
is poscible  wi~hin each of these .elements  s.nd ·in tho  wccy- they en.n  h'l 
/  . 
combined  to create the  compl~te tax.  I~ deciding on  the. most  n'ppropri11.i 
fiscal  instrument  for the'preaent purposes,  choices will  ncflrl  to  hP. 
~ade between  the  following possibilities  : 
- method.  of impoei tion  I  whether ad  v~lorem, specific,. or variable 
levy; 
coverage  •  the  extreme~ of the. variants possi'\>le  go  from  a  to.x  0 
on  crude oil alone  to a  tax  at a  uniform rate applied  to  a.ll 
energy consumption; 
choice of the' taxable event  1  whether at  importation,  production 
or consumption. 
2ol o  Method of imposition 
2~lolo  A variable  leyY could in theory be applied as· the diffcrenoo  bctwe('!'l 
market  price  and  e.  reference prioeo  Such  a  scheme  would ·be  {~xtrc:nnly 
complex to administer  ..  A system  for  permanent  and  rnpict  monitorin~ 
of prices would  be  eseen~ial, as ·would provision  for  irmnr-:cti"t·~ 
changes  in the  levy rate·in response  to market·prine  chrmp;cF.I.  In 
any case'  (see  also  Annex  .  ¢n  harmonisation of enerP.:Y  pri  r;r~o 
and  taxo.tion)  the  considerable variations in the  covorage  nnd  rr-ttne 
of nationa.l  taxes would' defeat the  obj~ctive ·of such  a  nohcmo. 
2elo_2e  An  ad  vnlorum ·would of course  move  automatically with  prico. 
Frequent  changes  in tax rate to keep  pace  with  inflntion would  not 
therefore  be  necessaryo  o-n  the  other hand,  in  view of the  m::\nniv~ 
oil price  changes  in recent· months  and  to ·be  expected  in  t}H~  i'uhtro 
this automatic effect could also cause difficulty,  einco  thl1  u rrect 
of any  exogeneous  price  increases w·o·\lld  be  aui.omaticnlly mul tiplie 
by the ·tax rateo  Finally9  ad  valon.un  taxes ara particularly d1. l'ficu 
to administer \'shere  the  price of a  product is volatile anrl  Vl\rimJ 
rapidly with the market  situationo 
2ole)o  By  contrast,  a  s~cifio tax oftere a  variety of attraotiona 
·- ease  and  relative certainty of administrations  .  . 
r-eduction ifi. the  fluo·tua:tione  of o.Gn~nuner prices reln.'H  v~ to ox-
tax prices and· in· tha  P_l'ioa  spread between differ<lnt· oonm.ur.ption 
&rea a; .- 3  ..;. 
if neqeesar~  the·~ma:n&gement of' a.  specific tax offers poaaibili ties 
of adjustment  (by reference  to_ ex-tax .pr~oes,  by product,  by 
reference  to the' evolution of the  ~neral pric.e  .,  -level)  equal 
to  othe~ methode of .impoei  tion_e 
It _should,· however,  be  noted that·  a  specific-tax would  have  di  ffe,rent  . 
. ' 
·  e~feots~  d~pending on  the pruchaeing  pow~ra of the  ~iember States.-
. 2o_2., Covera~ 
· 2a2al.  A general  con~ption tax on energy encourages  eoon~my in the  uoe  of 
all  forma  of' energy without differentiation,  and new  and  renewable 
e~ergy sources would aiso be  ta:Xed.  }.1oreover,  the  tnx. rate  would  nce6. 
.  - -
to .be  substantial to have  e.  significant  impact  on  demand.  Any  m~ch true. 
.  '  :  .  .  .  .  . 
would, also raise controversial  technical  issues related .to  the  equi-
valence ..  of different  fuels;  ft _would  in addition require  the 
•  -eet~ing up of a  cumbersome  administrative machinery,  the  coot  of 
which  could well  be  out  of pr·o~ortion to tho  tax ra.te  invol vcd. 
Finally,· such a  tax would  tend to plaoe  .. a  relatively heavier burden 
on  ~lectricity; which would  run counter to the  aim  of dovelopin~ 
coal  and nuclear. energyo  '  . 
In- the  nboence  of a·genera:l·energy tax an·alterna.tive  course  would  bl.'! 
.. 
to concentrate  on the possibilities of a  tax ·confined to oilso  A 
further attraction lies in the  fact  that the mS\ohinory  for oontroll  in 1 ~ 
.\ 
()il-·refining and  for taxing oil products alrendy exiete in all  thP. 
Member  ~tates;, 
2.). ·Taxable  event· 
2  .. 3.1 ..  Importation 
A pustoms. duty  .. confined to orude oil .could be  avoided ·by importing,. 
'  -· 
:rree of  .tax~  refined petroleum products  ..  ~n striotm;es,  therefo~.,, 
tpe duty should apply botn to crude  and refined petroleum  prodU'cts. 
The  tariff arrangements  for  petroleUJTI  are particulnrly oomplicrlted, 
.  . 
but  if the  present struotl1re  of' the  CCT  is respeoted;  .the  ndrni-n.iotratior 
'and· ooUeotion  o~ the •  t.ax  should -;.ot  present: major  pro'Qlomo • 
.  /~ 4 -
•  The  simplest approach would lie 1n a  single rate of duty applying 
to all petrofeum products.  However,  assuming a  apecific ~-uty woro 
applied at  a  single rate  ·to  unrefined products,  its relati  vo 
incidence  on the unrefined products  would  be  higher than  on  the 
refined.  This could  in theory produce  an incenti  va  to di  vP.rt  re finine 
activities away  from. the  Communi tyo  If the  rates ware different  in  ten 
according to the  VCU'ious  types of petroleum products,  the  pro'blcm. 
·of calculat;ng appropriate rates for each tariff 1 ina  \iOuld  nrinc  .• 
Alternatively, if the duty rate were  to be  low 1  and  notwithet"'anding 
the  possible  (small) incentive  to divert  refini~g abroad,  the 
application of the  same  rate to unrefined  and  refined products 
would enjoy the.ad.vantages both of simplicity n.nd  inr:renoed  ncceptn-
bili  ty abroado 
The· existing Community  im.rard  processing arrangements  could  b~ uAed 
'  .  ' 
to· provide_ relief for exported goodso ·Member  States alrendy use. the 
- . 
'  inward processing arrangements to relieve petrolewn products  from 
national  fiscal duties.  The  addition of custom duties  should not 
present major difficulties  ..  The  arrangements would not;  however, 
enable  du~y relief to be  allowed' on  petroleum products Used  aD  n 
source' of energyo 
2e3o2o  Production 
At  the national level, sxoises are  applied on domestic  production 
of e.  wide  range. of goodav .and are  extended  in like manner  to  imports, 
~n conformlty with GATT  rules,  but do not exist  a.t  the  Community 
leve~··  At  the  present  time,  there is no  tax in existence  for  taxin,o: 
the  int~rna.l production of orude oil. 
However,  from  the  administration standpoint,  it would  in principle 
be  fenoible  to levy a· Communi'ty  production tax equally on  crudo  oil 
imports  and  an internal production of crude  oil.Suc.h  a.  tax,  in  ito_ 
simplest  fonn,  could be  expressed as a· fixed  specific o.rnount  per ton 
of crudo. oil.  As  crude  oil production is already subject to  a. 
considerable degrpe  of control  (e.g.  for direct and  royalty tax 
purposes). a  production true  in that  fonn  oould be  administerod  without 
undue  dltti_!"ulty. 
./. Whilst  such a  ta, could operate  tn'so simple  a  form  with a  relatively 
modest-rate' (with,an incidence-of-'ea:y- a  few.per  c~nt) a  aignifi- .  .  -
ca.ntly higher rate would  give rise, either to  eeri~us distortions, 
.  . 
··of to complex administration,  and·  possibly to. both  •.  For example, 
a  sizeable rate would  almost certainly\req\lire' a  matching  eyatem of 
compensatory chargee-at  import and-restitutions at export-of refined 
products.  For such  a ·tax to be _consistent .with o.ur  international 
obliB-ations,  th~se  ~ha_rgee and restitutions_ shou].d  in etrictneoa 
preci's-ely equate with the rate on (,)rude'oil.  This could prove  a 
very difficult undertaking,  and relatively o·omplex  to administer. 
2e3o3e  C-onsumption 
'  All. the Member  States currently tax  th~ consumption of refined mineral 
ofl  produOtS&·~ere are Wide  Variations in both the  COverage  Of  th~AO 
.taxes,  and  in their rates;,  Howe·ver,  whatever their detailed di  ffnr..;ncor.,: 
.  . .  .  . .,.  .  . 
. they are  in general  levied overwhelmingly on  the  consumption of ror.vl 
fuels,  heating fuels and -lubricants;.  As  stated earlier,  a  Commiooion · 
pr~posa.l  to,harmoniso  their otr:uctures is alreaay before- the  Couridl •. 
If it were  decided that a.CommW1ity  ta.x  should-cover nll  conf3umption  - . 
of oil·s,  this proposal. could  s·erve as a  basis  for a  harmonieod  covornge  1 
subject  to~  necessary amendment  to take account·of specific energy 
objectives,  (in particular,  to  e~end.·the tax  co~erage to honvy  fuel 
oils, oils-used as raw materials and  .lu~ricants,  for nll of which 
I 
exemption is at present proposed). 
2.3.4.  A hybrid  formula. 
A f'u:ther  possibility is to.combine  a  Community  Customs  duty on  imported 
.  ) 
.·crude  oil_ with identical, but· nationally imposed,  levies. on  internal 
crude oil production.  The  chief advantage  of such· a  schonie  would  lie 
~  '  ...........  - . 
in the  relative ease with which  such a  ·soheme  oould be.introduoed 
institutionally .and  in its  conf~rniity .with  ~ur internationn~ obligr,1tions  • 
. From  the  standpoint of fiscal 'administration9  and  ~sewning  iden~i  ty 
of treatment of indigenous and  imported crude _oils,  ouch  a  hybrid 
·.has the essential characteristics of an internal tax levied nt  tho 
I 
productiort- stago; The  technica~ implications woUld  be  b~oadl_y. tho  ahma 
aa those  alroody indicated above  for a  produoUon· tax· levied equnlly : 
..  .  . 
on EEC,oil production and  on 'imported oils. 
.;. ...  ·6 ...  1'. 
3•  S£ecial  selective fiscal measures 
As  an alternative to a  m'ore  or lees general increase in the  trucn.tion 
imposed  on  energy,  selective fiscal  instruments are of course  an  option~ . 
Such  measures  could in addition be  directed towards  sp~cific energy 
objectives.  Examples  of such measures  would  be  1 
3.1. a  special .tax  on  heavy  fuel  oils in order to discourage its use  in 
electricity generation,  to encourage  industry· to economise  in its use, 
and  to make  other fuels relatively more  attractive  •  .  '  . 
Such  a-tax would  of course  have  an 1mpact  on  ~ndustrial competitiveness, 
but this woUld  not be  significant at a  mod~st rate of tax. 
3.2. a  Community  tax on  road  fuels 
The  possibility of a  Community  own  resource ·from  petrol  (gasoline) was 
raised in the Green Paper on  new  own  resources  (cor~(78) 531,  P• 22)o 
.  . 
If a  new  own  resource were  to be  obtained via increased tnxntion  on 
' 
petrol it should also be  considered whether the additional  Co1imlW1i ty 
I 
levy should be  extended to other road fuels;  The  impact  on  induotrinl  .  . 
coste would  be  negr'igibl'e.·  Imposition and collection of tho  tax would 
present no  administrative  problems  ..  However,  petrol  ie.already themoat 
·heavily taxed oil product. Moreover,  there are no  ready eubsi tutes 
for  these fuels  ..  Consequently.,  although  such  a  tax mi.ght  hnvo  .  some  effects 
on  con13umptlon~ theoo could only be marginal,  given the  low  rate  implied 
by the  revenue objective. 
., 
A furthcr'consideration,  particular to the  transport  sector,  would  also 
need to be  borne  in mind.  In transport,  taxes on  fuels and  taxes  on 
vehicles must  pe  considered together;  changes  ~one  may  well  lead 
to offsetting changes  in the other. This would  certainly be  the result 
when  the draft  direo~ive on  commercial  vehicle taxation,  agre~d in 
principia by the  Council  in  197~, cornea  into effect.  To  avoid ·this, 
it would  be  necessary for any special energy tax olearly to be  distin-
guished from  the existing sys~em of taxes. en  transport.: 
./  .. - 7-
Given the veri/ low tax rates likel;y to obtain· any advantage  :from 
the  standpoint of e~ergy objectives of combining a  number  of tax 
'  .  '  .  .  . 
instruments'  woul,d  almost certainly be  outwe.ighe4 by the  incroaaed . 
B.droinistra·tive  complications~ 